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GERMANY'S POLITICAL TURNING-POINT.

BY WOLF VON SCHIERBRAND.

FOR years past Germany's policy, domestic and foreign, has been vacillating. It has now arrived at a point where irresolution becomes impossible. There must be decision, and there must be a break with the past. She must change her foreign policy, and she must modify her fiscal policy. The Dreibund is crumbling before our very eyes, and the important tariff bill now before the Reichstag is a clinching proof that Germany intends to alter her policy in that respect. Count von Bülow's recent declarations before the Reichstag showed, as plainly as the words of a statesman of purely diplomatic training can do, that reliance is no longer placed on the international confederation composed of Germany, Austria, and Italy; and these declarations have been so understood by the entire German press. The Kaiser's advances during the last few years both to this country and to England, of which the mission of his brother, Prince Henry, is but the latest and most striking illustration, clearly point out the direction which he means to give to Germany's foreign policy in the near future.

In the chapter of Bismarck's Memoirs which is devoted to a discussion of the genesis and the probable duration of the Dreibund, the matter is treated without any reserve. Bismarck there makes it plain that the understanding with Austria was based,

primarily, on the assumption that a war with Russia was likely to come, not one with France; and the admission of Italy was designed to vouchsafe that country and Germany against French aggression. That Bismarck, when he wrote that chapter, not long before his death, had begun to have strong misgivings as to the intrinsic and lasting force of this tripartite agreement, is evident from the concluding paragraph, in which he says:

“The Triple Alliance is a strategic position which, in view of the dangers threatening at the time of its conclusion, was advisable, and was the best that could be attained under existing circumstances. It has from time to time been prolonged, and we may succeed in prolonging it again; but no lasting treaty of this kind is possible between great Powers, and it would be unwise to regard it as a secure foundation for every kind of possibility, which may change in the days to come the conditions, needs, and sentiments which once made it possible.”

He winds up with a sceptical expression of even a more decided cast. Since Bismarck's death, conditions have altered more rapidly than could have been foreseen then. Russia under Nicholas II. has become eminently peaceful. The Panslavic movement has been arrested. More friendly relations than existed for fifty years past have been established between Russia and Austria. There is no longer any fear on Austria's part of Russian aggression. For Austria, then, the reason which controlled her in becoming a member of the Dreibund no longer exists. On the other hand, Austrian internal politics have simultaneously changed in a manner more and more hostile, or at least more averse, to the alliance with Germany. The Czechs, the Poles in Galicia, and all the other Slavic populations of the polyglot empire, have gained political ascendancy; they have been, from the first, opponents of the Dreibund, and they are more opposed to it now than ever. The Polish question in Prussia has of late greatly embittered the Poles against Germany, which they regard as a persecutor of their race. The pending German tariff bill adds new fuel to this feeling. In Italy, the situation is similar. Italy no longer fears French hostility, and the recent Italian naval demonstration in French harbors was intended and accepted as an outward sign of mutual good-will. The long Franco-Italian tariff war is over, and an amiable understanding between the two nations as to the Mediterranean question, and as to Tunis and Tripoli, has removed the last inflammable material. Therewith the chief reason which

induced Italy to join the Dreibund has disappeared, and she, too, looks upon the proposed German tariff legislation as inimical to her fiscal interests. The alliance with Austria was always unpopular in Italy because of the *Italia Irredenta* movement, which was handicapped under Dreibund auspices; and of late the Francophiles, always a large and very influential part of the nation, have gained enormously in Italy.

In a word, then, so far as the other two members of the Dreibund are concerned, no important reason obtains any longer for their remaining in it; and a number of important reasons tell against the further continuance of this alliance. But for Germany, too, several potent factors have come to the surface which make against the Dreibund as the pivotal point of Germany's foreign policy. The chief one, perhaps, is the military weakening of both Austria and Italy, whose resources, in the event of a future big war, both on land and sea, are, relatively speaking, much smaller now than when the Dreibund was formed. Aside from that, however, with her taking a front place as a "World Power," Germany has had to reckon, and will have in future to reckon, with other Powers which are strong in commerce, in colonies, and in naval force, these being England and the United States. Neither Austria nor Italy has been in a condition, or willing, to further Germany's vital interests as a sea-power, and as an expansive, commercial and colonial empire. With France and Russia more closely than ever allied in Europe and abroad, and with Germany's inability to attain to the rank of the first naval power, it is manifestly her interest to put herself not only on a thoroughly friendly footing, but on terms of intimate friendship, if not on those of a formal alliance, with the only two powers that are, so to speak, open to such an engagement. This would not mean that Germany would entirely relinquish her long-continued friendship with Italy and Austria. As far as she is able to do so she will tenderly nurse those good relations; but the character and importance of them, nevertheless, will undergo, has even now undergone, a very great change. They will henceforth be of secondary consideration, and by no means the determining factor in her foreign policy.

Now, as to England, the anomaly is presented that, while the German Emperor and his government are anxious to tighten the political affiliations with that country, and while, particularly,

the Kaiser's strong sympathies and desires go out in that direction, the overwhelming public opinion of Germany is averse to this. It is within the truth to say that a sentiment of downright, bitter hostility, of a strength seldom equalled in his usually placid bosom, rages in the breast of the average German against his English cousin at the present moment. Sentiment counts for something in that. The war against the Boer republics has all along been strongly condemned in Germany, largely for sentimental reasons; and that feeling has been so widespread and powerful that even the Kaiser, on one or two occasions, and the Imperial Chancellor, had to take it into account. Other sentimental reasons lying farther back there also are; and there is, besides, the fact that England for a time took a somewhat unfriendly attitude towards Germany's colonial aspirations, and that England has been Germany's chief commercial rival, and not always a generous or fair one. At any rate, there is no doubt that an Anglophile foreign policy is just now unpopular with the larger, and the politically dominant, part of the German people. The Liberal political parties in Germany, who traditionally favor such a policy, are not the determining factors in her political life.

But, while all this is true, it does not mean that a foreign policy friendly to England is impossible in Germany, even at this moment. For the Kaiser practically shapes her foreign policy. The Imperial Chancellors since Bismarck's retirement have, virtually, merely carried out their imperial master's behests, and have vouchsafed only that measure of explanation to the Reichstag and Bundesrath, for the steps taken or decided upon in Germany's relations with other countries, which they saw fit and considered safe. It is idle to discuss here the question whether this is in strict consonance with the constitution of the Empire. Certain it is, that such has been the unvarying practice since the Kaiser, twelve years ago, took hold of the helm himself and became, to use Bismarck's expression, his own Chancellor. And that the Kaiser is strongly in favor of an Anglophile foreign policy, there is not the shadow of a doubt.

As to the United States, things in a measure are similar. When the war with Spain broke out, in the spring of 1898, the German people violently, and almost altogether for sentimental reasons, sided with Spain; indeed, until the close of that war, the torrent of popular abuse of the United States flowed as fiercely and was

fed from as many sources as that which is now directed against England. The German government, however, took a consistently friendly attitude toward the United States—a fact which recent publications have brought out clearly. This, it may be admitted here, was due at first more to Count von Bülow—then still Secretary of Foreign Affairs under Prince Hohenlohe—than to the Kaiser personally, whose sympathies for a time rather leaned to Spain. But the Kaiser is, after all, Bismarck's pupil, and as such he considers concrete facts as of paramount importance. He quickly came to see that the United States was bound to be victorious, that Spain represented a lost cause, and that the United States would emerge from the war much stronger and more ambitious than ever, and become a new and leading factor in the process of reshaping the world. He saw clearly that Germany's interests bade her remain the best of friends with the United States; and, once he had recognized this, he frankly and without reserve accepted the new situation, and shaped his policy accordingly. The relentless force of logic told him that the closer Germany's relations became with the great American republic, the better chance would there be for a friendly understanding with it at all those points where its new political or commercial interests might clash with those of Germany. His foresight has since been proven true in the settlement of the Samoa difficulty, in the acquisition of the Carolines, and during the recent troubles in China.

In his political calculations, he took into account the policy of expansion to which the dominant party in this country stands committed, and he has since given adherence to the American definition of the Monroe Doctrine. Is he sincere in this? Has Germany absolutely relinquished those old, but never more than half-formed, designs upon West Indian and South American territory? Does Germany consider herself bound, under all circumstances, to abide by that interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine which rests, not so much upon the vigorous yet withal conservative enunciation quite recently made by President Roosevelt, as upon that somewhat hazy yet tangible and more far-reaching idea of it held by the larger half of the American people? Time alone will show. At any rate, neither the Kaiser, nor the German government, nor the even more important public opinion of Germany, any longer defines the Monroe Doctrine as Bismarck did in my hearing, on May 26th, 1898 (two months before his death),

as "a species of arrogance peculiarly American and quite inexcusable." True, the Pan-Germans and the colonial enthusiasts in Germany continue to rail against this "species of arrogance"; and in a late issue of the leading German colonial organ, the "*Koloniale Zeitschrift*," Dr. Rudolf Breitscheid declaims against it and against the alleged, unholy designs of the United States upon South and Central America, and calls upon Count von Bülow to quicken the pace of German colonization in South Brazil and Argentina. But he and his kind do not influence the German foreign policy. There is no manner of doubt that Germany—Kaiser, government, and people—is at present honestly desirous of close and friendly relations with the United States.

Apparently at variance with this statement is the fact that there is now before the Reichstag, after approval by both the imperial government and the Bundesrath, a tariff bill whose provisions, so far as the more important agricultural and industrial articles of import are concerned, are evidently largely aimed at the United States. Yet only apparently. For one thing, this bill is by no means sure of passage; and then—and that is the main point—the Kaiser and the government can hardly help themselves. In other words, the Agrarian Party, so-called, which is the *spiritus rector* of this highly important tariff measure, has government and Kaiser by the throat. I am aware that this sounds like a paradox, after what has been said about the Kaiser's controlling influence upon the foreign policy of the Empire. But it is, nevertheless, true. And that needs some explanation.

The party which for want of a better name is called the Agrarian Party in Germany is, politically considered, made up of the entire Conservative faction—nearly the whole Centre (or Ultramontane Party), the small Antisemite faction, the German Husbandry Federation, and the small Yeomen's League, besides a number of representatives of the Polish, the Guelph, and the Alsatian factions. This statement carries the reader right into the midst of German petty factional strife; and, to make my meaning more plain, let me put it in this way: The Agrarian Party is made up of the representatives of the landed proprietors of Germany in the Reichstag. Out of a total of 397 members of that body, they claim to have over 200 on their side, enough to carry the bill. Inasmuch, however, as the bill, if passed at all in the Reichstag, will be considerably amended, it must go back

to the Bundesrath for approval. It is quite safe to say that that body will not ratify the bill in its altered form, in which case the measure will have miscarried. A new bill will then have to be prepared by the government and the Bundesrath, to be in turn submitted to a Reichstag, either the same one, or, if the present one be dissolved and new general elections ordered, the new one; and the new one would be sure to be, in view of the unmistakable temper of the electors, very different in its composition. Thus it will be seen that the fate of this bill is, at best, very uncertain, and that before there is any chance of its becoming a law both government and Bundesrath, and the nation at large, will have considerable time for reflection and sober second thought.

The reasons for the introduction of this tariff bill are complex. Between 1892 and 1894, a number of important commercial treaties were concluded by Germany, at the instance of Count Caprivi, Bismarck's successor, with some of her chief customers, viz., Austria, Russia, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Roumania. The United States had to be left out of this list, because, like France (by the Treaty of Frankfort-on-Main), the United States shared, under the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty of 1828 with Prussia, at once and without any intervening negotiations, in all the benefits and tariff reductions which these new treaty nations had acquired, on the principle of give-and-take, by these special agreements with Germany. Now, the agriculturists of Germany, but especially the large and influential landed proprietors, claim that these commercial treaties, which will expire on December 31st, 1903, have done them incalculable harm, not alone because they have brought into the country the cheaper agricultural products of the new treaty states, but more particularly because they have admitted, on the same terms, the even cheaper ones of the United States, without corresponding benefits from the latter. And, in a measure, this is true. Of course, under the treaty of 1828, the position of the United States in this matter has been impregnable; and how largely this country has profited from the chances thus afforded for a much larger trade with Germany, the ever-increasing balance of trade in favor of the United States has shown year after year. According to German official statistics, this country sold to Germany in 1900-01 nearly three times the amount it took—a proportion vastly greater to Germany's disadvantage than was the case with any other country that the Empire

had dealings with. Agricultural conditions in Germany (and more especially in the eastern provinces of Prussia, where large estates are the rule, not the exception, as in the western provinces and in South Germany), have grown steadily worse since the commercial treaties of 1892-94 went into effect; and many titled estate-holders had to abandon their paternal acres, impoverished and embittered. It is true, on the other hand, that these same commercial treaties have been the chief means of increasing German industries and commerce, and the unparalleled rise of the Empire as an exporting centre has been due to them.

Now, one view of the matter is, that Germany has become a country where industry and commerce predominate; that she is passing through an agricultural crisis similar to that through which England passed several decades ago, and for similar reasons; and that, inasmuch as the industrial and commercial interests of the country have now become the paramount ones, and three-fifths of her total population (as the imperial census of 1895 showed) are now engaged in industrial or commercial pursuits, the interests of the larger part of the nation must rule, that low-priced foodstuffs are of the first importance to this majority, and that this view must prevail, even if agriculture suffers. That, of course, is the view taken by the industrial and commercial classes, who fear the ruin of Germany's young industries if the bill should become law; and it is also the view of the laboring masses. But there is still another view, and its adherents are both numerous and influential. They argue that, after all, agriculture is the backbone of a nation, and that, with that backbone broken, the country, impotent to nourish its own people, with foes all around, would be at the mercy of its neighbors and enemies, a ready prey in war. They further argue that Germany draws from the small but traditionally powerful class of her landed and titled proprietors the brain and brawn of her army, of her whole governmental machine, the larger part of her legislators, and the *personnel* of the imperial court and of the courts of all her smaller sovereign rulers. This latter view is held, too, by the Kaiser, by Count von Bülow, by Count Posadowsky, and probably by nine-tenths of all the persons with whom the Kaiser comes in contact. Add to this that the papers which support the Agrarian cause skilfully and unceasingly are the only German papers that the Kaiser reads, and that that part of the press has persistently

and with great cunning waged a campaign of calumny against the United States, and it will readily be seen how powerful is the cause of Agrarianism in Germany, and above all in Prussia.

The Agrarians believe that their hour is come, that they can force this greatly amended bill through to suit their wishes, and that they can make the Kaiser and the Bundesrath accept it. In this they are, nevertheless, probably mistaken; but that they hold an unusually strong position there is no doubt. The negotiations between Germany and the United States, which were carried on for a number of years past, mostly in Washington, in a desultory way, came to nothing, presumably because the United States was quite satisfied with the existing state of affairs, which gave her, without lifting a finger or incurring the slightest sacrifice, all and more than she could obtain by special treaty. The Agrarians now hope to do away entirely, by means of this bill, with American competition, and thus restore their old-time prosperity. Of course, they are bitterly opposed to any such close *entente* with the United States as the Kaiser and the larger part of the nation dream of. How the Kaiser will finally get out of this predicament is matter of conjecture. The effort to disentangle him will test the justice of Count von Bülow's claim to the name of statesman.

There is, however, still another consideration which makes the Kaiser, his government, and a number of the sovereign rulers of the other German states, so willing to show favor to the Agrarian claims; and that is the belief that they, composed largely of the landed nobility of the Empire, are the main bulwark against the rising flood of socialism, against revolution, against the designs, as they believe, of the proletarian rabble to upset throne and altar and to plunge the country into bloody civil strife. This faith—which, of course, the Agrarian press and party do everything in their power to foster—strengthens the Agrarian hold upon a large and misguided part of the upper middle-class as well. And by pressing this argument, the Agrarian press has succeeded in beclouding many minds and in befogging the real issues.

There is a strong probability that, if the majority of these mortgage-ridden lords of the soil, who are now putting all the blame for their gradual impoverishment upon the competition of the United States, were to give up their careless and spendthrift mode of living, their haphazard methods of managing their estates, and to introduce rigid economy, modern methods of tilling the

soil, and give their undivided attention to agriculture, they might succeed within a number of years in putting their estates on a paying basis, without much aid from the government. But they find it easier and pleasanter, of course, to get government help in the shape of higher import duties on all agricultural products, larger internal taxes on beet-sugar and spirits, and bigger export bounties on both. Besides, land for agricultural purposes is to-day too high in Germany, and estates seldom yield more than from two and a half to four per cent., after all expenses and the interest on the mortgages and floating debts have been paid.

Of special interest is the growth of Socialism as a political factor in Germany. It must be borne in mind that Germany is the birthplace of Socialism, and that it has attained a higher development there than anywhere else. First, as to its numerical development. In 1877, the Socialists cast 493,000 votes at the Reichstag elections, as against the Centre's 1,341,000, for instance, and against the National Liberals' 1,468,000. In 1878 and 1879, owing to Bismarck's repressive measures, the Socialist vote dropped to 312,000. But from that time until the last general election, that of 1898, the Socialist vote rose steadily and rapidly, and in 1898 it attained to 2,107,000, while the vote of all the other parties gradually went down, and to-day some of these parties poll barely one-fourth of their former strength. The Socialists to-day are, in point of numbers, by far the largest party; and at the next election they will reach the two-million-and-a-half mark, and possibly exceed it. But even in 1898, when the total vote was something above seven millions, they represented two-sevenths of it. The National Liberal Party, for many years the strongest and most influential one, to-day represents but half the voting strength of the Socialists. And it must be remembered that this phenomenal growth has been brought about in the teeth of all the repression to which existing laws would lend themselves, and despite all the disadvantages in life to which, in a country like Germany, the Socialist cohorts are subject. It is a curious record, and it becomes intelligible only if the circumstances which led up to it are understood.

Let it be said, then, that Germany is a country where legislation is class legislation in a unique degree. This is a strong charge to make against a country otherwise so enlightened as Germany. But the charge is amply borne out by the facts. Be-

fore going into that, however, one or two other things may be referred to. The political development of Germany, and to a minor degree her social and commercial development, have brought it about that the "fourth estate"—the laboring man, the mechanic, the small shop-keeper, the farm-hand—has never been able to acquire what the same class of the population has acquired in France since the great Revolution, in England during the course of the nineteenth century, on social and political lines, and what has been the birthright of every man in the great American Republic since its foundation. The only revolution that ever took place in Germany, that of 1848-49, proceeded from the middle-classes, and had purely political reform for its aim. It lasted, besides, too short a time, and was not successful in the end. When its waves had rolled back, things returned much to their old level. Thus it was that the status of the lower classes, and of the poorer middle-classes, had virtually not changed when Lassalle and Marx and the other earlier Socialist leaders began to make their appeals to the "proletariat"; and, excepting the political and social awakening for which the Socialist Party is responsible in Germany, there has come no other to the masses of the lower strata. They are still, even where the leaven of Socialism has worked, rather behind their fellows in countries more favored politically, so far as self-respect, maturity of convictions, and sturdy independence are concerned.

These reasons alone explain, to some extent, the remarkable rise of Socialism as a political power in Germany. But there is, as pointed out above, the further fact that legislation there, more than elsewhere, is class legislation, and that the poorer classes, from which, of course, the Socialist army mainly recruits itself, are in many ways discriminated against. This fact obtrudes itself upon every impartial observer in Germany, and it is this which gives the Socialist agitator most of his ammunition. For proof of this claim, one has not far to go. Take, for example, the tax question. The German imperial budget for 1898-99 was 4,980,000,000 marks, or about 1200 million dollars. Of this sum 14 per cent. went to the army and 10 per cent. to the navy. About twenty dollars *per capita* is what the German imperial government required. This, be it noted, does not include all the taxes raised by the separate states, towns, and provinces for their own support. Of course, the laboring population has to pay its full share for

the support of both navy and army, about seventy-three out of every hundred serving belonging to that class. Now, where does a large part of the taxes come from? The tax and revenue system in Germany seems to be gotten up so as to lie with crushing force upon the weary backs of the poor. As witness these German official figures for 1900-01: The whole sum from import duties for 1901 is 478,978,000 marks. Of this the duty on cereals was 131,557,000 marks; on petroleum, 70,913,000; on coffee, 64,503,000; on lard, 12,540,000; on cotton, yarn and finished, 8,804,000; on meats, 8,459,000; on rice, 5,365,000; on salt herrings, 3,045,000; on cheese, 2,991,000; on tea, 2,856,000; on eggs, 2,793,000; on cattle and sheep, 2,666,000; on butter and margarine, 2,608,000; on table fats, 2,382,000, &c. It will be noticed that these articles, which are so greatly enhanced in price in Germany by high duties, are all articles for the poor man's consumption. Then, as to the internal revenue taxes. Three of the principal ones, viz., on tobacco, sugar, and on salt, and the tax on home-made spirituous liquors, figure in the returns for 1901, respectively, as 11,960,000 marks, 111,380,000, and 48,943,000; and liquor, which is twice taxed for internal consumption, is put down as 109,768,000 and 18,087,000, while the brewing tax amounts to 31,136,000. The government which thus raises the price of nearly every foodstuff the poor require, encourages the distiller (who is nearly always owner of a big rural estate) in every possible way.

This record of sins of commission and omission on the part of the German government towards the lower classes, could be greatly lengthened by speaking of the anti-strike laws; of the manner in which justice is habitually strained to the injury of the poor; of the shame and anomaly of the *lese majeste* trials; of the laws in large districts of Germany which render marriage difficult for the poor man (and resulting, for instance, in Bavaria in the enormous illegitimate birth-rate of twenty-six out of every hundred); of the practical denial of the constitutional "right of association"; of the police practices of enforcing antiquated contract laws in a one-sided manner against the rural and city laborer, &c. But the above will suffice to illustrate the point.

The Polish question in Prussia has of late again become acute. It will continue to vex not alone Prussia but Germany as a whole, and it is exerting a seriously disturbing influence upon the foreign policy of the Empire. No doubt, the largely Polish provinces of

Prussia—Posen, West and East Prussia—are now in every way, material, intellectual, and social, in a much better condition than when they still formed part of Poland; and the gradual rise of a “third estate,” of a middle-class, the want of which probably contributed more to the downfall of Poland than any other single factor, is wholly due to Prussia’s wise administrative measures and to compulsory education. But the two and a half millions of Poles dwelling under Prussian rule, have not ceased to think of themselves as Poles, and their race and religious hatred of their masters has in nowise abated. Nor have their aspirations for national independence and for a regeneration of Poland. Their methods in resisting the process of amalgamation have been effectively systematized, so much so that, in spite of the severe measures of the Prussian government, and despite the lavish use of the so-called colonization fund, now amounting to a round 100,000,000 marks—one of Bismarck’s latest schemes to stem the Polish tide—the Poles during the last ten years have begun to recover a good deal of lost ground, and are successfully forging Posen, parts of the other two provinces, and the eastern portion of Silesia, into a homogeneous Polish whole. The Poles in Prussia look longingly across the Austrian frontier, where their brethren in Galicia have been granted autonomy, and across even the Russian border, where they are the intellectual superiors of their Muscovite fellows, and conspire more or less openly in the sense indicated. There is no intention of immediate revolution, but they are biding their time, cautioned by past failures; and, in the meanwhile, they are knitting together, more and more closely, the bonds of race between the three fragments into which they were rent.

The enormous decrease of political Liberalism in Germany, which has been one of the most marked symptoms of the past decade, is that feature in the political life of the young Empire which fills the friend of Germany with deepest sorrow and with direst forebodings. During the sixties, the Liberals were the dominant party, and the government of old Emperor William I. had to reckon with them as a most serious factor. Since then, the National Liberals have gone down from 1,468,600 votes to 971,300, and they have ceased to be Liberals in the political sense of that word, and now include the most violent jingoes in Germany. The other three Liberal sections, the old Progressive Party,

the Liberal Association, and the People's Party, have come down to 862,000 votes, combined. All the Liberals elected either to the Reichstag or the Prussian Diet are numerically too weak to undertake a policy of their own, and they lack cohesion and a community of political aims and interests. Thus, they shift about and are barely able, now and then, to defeat a specially obnoxious measure by filibustering tactics; but they cannot create any legislation of their own. Under such dispiriting influences, they have become merely negative. This decrease of Liberalism has occurred since jingoism was injected into German politics, since a blatant and ill-directed greed for colonies took hold of a large part of the nation. Of course, it is too early to surmise what, if anything, will come of those colonial dreams. Riper experience may bring greater wisdom and skill. But it is a fact that Germany's colonies have not thus far proved a blessing to her in any sense. They do not, above all, afford her a channel for her commercial enterprise nor for the surplus of her population, and merely looked at as financial ventures they have proven unmistakable failures. Nevertheless, the present temper of the great majority of the nation is to hold on to the present colonies, and to acquire new ones.

As for the process of welding together the different states of Germany into a more homogeneous entity, that is going on steadily though slowly. The process has already gone to that point where it is safe to say it would take more than one political hurricane to tear the component parts of the Empire asunder again. Germany is now in the full sense of the word a nation, one and indivisible. Nevertheless, the spirit of separatism, always very powerful since the dawn of German history, is still quite strong. It crops out, now and then, when least expected. But it is now a subordinate influence in German political life. Even the Bavarian, who holds most firmly to his idea of a "narrower fatherland," is now an imperialist first. No serious danger threatens Germany's future from that source, once so prolific of internal strife and bitter dissension.

WOLF VON SCHIERBRAND.